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PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY LESSONS AT
THE INTERSECTION OF THE INTERNET OF
THINGS AND POLICE BODY-WORN
CAMERAS*
PETER SWIRE** & JESSE WOO***
Prepared for the North Carolina Law Review symposium on
police body-worn cameras (“BWCs”), this Article shows that
BWCs can be conceptualized as an example of the Internet of
Things (“IoT”). By combining the previously separate literatures
on BWCs and IoT, this Article shows how insights from each
literature apply to the other.
Part I adopts the IoT definition of (1) a sensor connected to the
Internet that (2) stores and/or processes data remotely, typically
in the cloud. Applied to BWCs, the camera is a sensor, and the
video footage and related data are stored outside of the original
camera, often in the cloud.
Building on this equivalence of BWCs and IoT, Part II examines
lessons from the substantial IoT literature for BWC privacy and
cybersecurity. Part II systematically examines leading industry
standards and Federal Trade Commission guidance that could be
used to develop applicable criteria for good practice for BWCs.
Analysis of this literature suggests three themes for
operationalizing these best practices. First, police departments
can and should learn from the IoT literature to improve privacy
and cybersecurity for BWCs. Second, police departments should
use their bargaining power to demand security and privacy best
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practices from their vendors. Third, where departments lack the
in-house expertise to handle BWC security and privacy they
should seek it from outside institutions or consultants, including
from outside experts in IoT security and privacy.
Part III examines two areas where study of BWCs might offer
lessons for the broader domain of IoT. First, to protect police
officer privacy during breaks and for other reasons, BWCs are
not always on. By contrast, IoT best practices to date have not
emphasized the implications of toggling the sensor on and off.
Second, an important debate for BWCs is how to promote
transparency—to provide accountability while protecting
individual privacy. In this respect, BWCs are an application of
technology where public disclosure of the entire data feed is a
higher priority than for most other IoT applications to date.
Studying this debate can inform other IoT debates about when to
open full data feeds to the public, consistent with privacy and
cybersecurity concerns.
Privacy and cybersecurity risks will continue to evolve for both
IoT generally and BWCs more specifically. Recognizing the
overlap of these two usually distinct discourses can offer
assistance to those in both realms as they face the new risks.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines privacy and cybersecurity issues for the
topic of this symposium, police body-worn cameras (“BWCs”). BWCs
already generate, and will increasingly generate, a great amount of
video footage and related content. In our era of increasingly effective
facial recognition, this video footage generates a vast amount of
personally identifiable information, with consequent privacy issues.
Over time, the volume of video footage will increase enormously,
creating challenging cybersecurity issues for the data that is stored,
often in the cloud. Cities and police departments will face substantial
challenges in managing these privacy and cybersecurity issues.
To develop good privacy and cybersecurity practices for BWCs,
this Article proposes drawing on the already substantial experience
with the Internet of Things (“IoT”). Definitions of IoT abound,1 but
key aspects of the technology are (1) a sensor connected to the
Internet that (2) stores and/or processes data remotely, typically in
the cloud.2 Applied to BWCs, the camera is a sensor, and the video
footage and related data are stored outside of the original camera,
often in the cloud. Part I discusses the definition of IoT and describes
how the technical capabilities and uses of BWCs fit this definition.
Regulators, industry standards groups, and other experts have
already developed documents that set forth best practices for privacy
and cybersecurity in the IoT. In Part II, this Article examines three
sets of best practices, which we believe will assist large and small
police departments in recognizing and responding to privacy and
cybersecurity risks:

1. See Harald Bauer, Mark Patel & Jan Veira, The Internet of Things: Sizing up the
Opportunity, MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/hightech/our-insights/the-internet-of-things-sizing-up-the-opportunity [https://perma.cc/A9LTCU9K]; Andrew Meola, What is the Internet of Things (IoT)?, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19,
2016, 2:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-the-internet-of-things-definition2016-8 [https://perma.cc/782H-82EN].
2. See Sona R. Makker, Overcoming “Foggy” Notions of Privacy: How Data
Minimization Will Enable Privacy in the Internet of Things, 85 UMKC L. REV. 895, 897
(2017). When we say data is stored “in the cloud,” we mean it is stored on a remote server
via an internet connection. These servers are part of the infrastructure of “cloud
computing,” which is defined as “the delivery of on-demand computing resources—
everything from applications to data centers—over the internet on a pay-for-use basis.”
What is Cloud Computing?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/what-is-cloudcomputing [https://perma.cc/SR2J-WU9S].
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(1) The Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group
(“BITAG”)
has
promulgated
cybersecurity
and
privacy
recommendations for IoT.3 The BITAG report provides state-of-theart recommendations for IoT, especially for software.
(2) Microsoft has issued its Internet of Things Security Best
Practices.4 These complement the BITAG recommendations due to
their focus on good physical security and hardware practices.
(3) The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has written
extensively on IoT for both privacy and cybersecurity issues. Along
with the software and hardware recommendations of the BITAG and
Microsoft, the FTC has numerous recommendations about
appropriate administrative measures for the entire life-cycle of data
from collection, through storage and use, to eventual destruction.5
The expert IoT literature recommends security best practices,
such as patchability and encryption, and privacy best practices, such
as data minimization.6 This Article’s analysis of the literature suggests
three themes for operationalizing these best practices. First, police
departments can and should learn from the IoT literature to improve
privacy and cybersecurity for BWCs. Second, police departments
should use their bargaining power to demand security and privacy
best practices from their vendors. Third, when departments lack the
in-house expertise to handle BWC security and privacy, they should
seek it from outside institutions or consultants, including from outside
experts in IoT security and privacy.
Part III examines two areas where study of BWCs might offer
lessons for the broader domain of IoT. First, to protect police officer
privacy during breaks and for other reasons, BWCs are not always
on.7 By contrast, IoT sources such as the BITAG report and
3. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT)
SECURITY AND PRIVACY RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2016), https://www.bitag.org/documents
/BITAG_Report__Internet_of_Things_(IoT)_Security_and_Privacy_Recommendations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6AZM-V2XM].
4. See Dominic Bets & Yuri Diogenes, Internet of Things Security Best Practices,
MICROSOFT AZURE (Jan. 17, 2018), https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/iot-suite/iotsecurity-best-practices [https://perma.cc/6GQW-VTRY].
5. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED WORLD, at iii (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports
/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-thingsprivacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3AQ-UTQD].
6. Id. at 30–38.
7. JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED
CAMERAS 3 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5V7-S9TZ].
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Microsoft recommendations do not emphasize how to govern the
possibility of toggling the sensor on and off.8 Analysis of BWCs thus
may help supplement the existing IoT set of best practices. Second, an
important debate for BWCs is how to promote transparency—to
provide accountability while protecting individual privacy.9 In this
respect, BWCs are an application of technology where public
disclosure of the entire data feed is a higher priority than for most
other IoT applications to date.10 Studying this debate can inform
other IoT debates about when to open full data feeds to the public,
consistent with privacy and cybersecurity concerns.
I. POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS ARE PART OF THE INTERNET OF
THINGS
This Part discusses the definition of IoT and describes how the
technical capabilities and uses of police BWCs fit this definition. It
will also review the BWC and IoT scholarship to show how the
privacy and cybersecurity problems are similar for both technologies,
yet the literature has not typically made this connection.
A. The Functionality of BWCs Fits the Definition of IoT
This Section provides a brief technical definition of IoT and
shows how BWCs fit under that definition as an IoT device. IoT is a
rapidly growing category of technology that many analysts believe
will cause the next great wave of digitization and productivity
enhancement.11 Examples of IoT devices range from the internetconnected Amazon Echo speaker to connected traffic lights and
smart utility meters.12 Many are excited for the potential of IoT
8. See BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at ii–iv; Bets
& Diogenes, supra note 4.
9. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF
BODY-WORN CAMERAS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES 2 (2015),
https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1984/gd_bwc_201502_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK28-P24M].
10. Cf. Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits,
68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 410–12 (2016) (demonstrating that public debate over police
accountability and America’s robust tradition of government transparency have spurred
enthusiasm for disclosure of BWC footage).
11. See Meola, supra note 1.
12. See Matt Bellias, 3 Ways IoT Will Change Smart Meters for Utilities, IBM:
INTERNET OF THINGS BLOG (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/internet-ofthings/smart-meter-grid/ [https://perma.cc/VS56-7D3S]; Arjun Kharpal, Amazon’s Alexa
Stole the Show at CES in a Bid to Become the Internet of Things Operating System, CNBC
(Jan. 6, 2017 10:43 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/06/ces-2017-amazon-alexa-stolethe-show-a-bid-to-become-the-iot-operating-system.html [https://perma.cc/9NXJ-7KNE];
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devices to monitor traffic congestion or the electrical grid.13 Often, the
power of IoT comes from the high volume of sensors that can be
deployed and connected within a system.14 Having many sensors
allows for precision monitoring of complex systems, which can help
with problems such as infrastructure maintenance, by identifying
failure points without the need for human inspection.15 Other
applications include smart homes devices (like the Nest thermometer)
and internet-connected medical devices that allow for more granular
control and personalization.16 Analysts project that by 2020, the IoT
market will grow to over $470 billion in annual revenue, with over
thirty billion devices installed.17
Definitions of IoT abound,18 but key aspects of the technology
are (1) a sensor connected to the internet that (2) stores and/or
processes data remotely, typically in the cloud.19 The sensor measures
some physical property of the world and may be aural, thermal,
chemical, or some other type, but in many cases, it is visual.20 It is also
SierraWireless, Smart Traffic Lights Help Ease the Burden of Rush Hour on City
Infrastructure, IOT BLOG (Jul. 21, 2017), https://www.sierrawireless.com/iot-blog/iotblog/2017/07/smart_traffic_lights_help_ease_the_burden_of_rush_hour_on_city_infrastructure/
[https://perma.cc/XE7Z-3YVM].
13. See, e.g., Qinghai Ou et al., Application of Internet of Things in Smart Grid Power
Transmission, 2012 THIRD FTRA INT’L CONF. ON MOBILE, UBIQUITOUS, &
INTELLIGENT COMPUTING 96, 96, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp
=&arnumber=6305831 [https://perma.cc/9DDH-X4ND (staff-uploaded archive)]; Tanvi T.
Thakur et al., Real Time Traffic Management Using Internet of Things, 2016 INT’L CONF.
ON COMM. AND SIGNAL PROCESSING 1950, 1950, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp
.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7754512 [https://perma.cc/2PWG-844Z (staff-uploaded archive)].
14. See Makker, supra note 2, at 897.
15. See Ou et al., supra note 13, at 99.
16. Mathias Cousin, Tadashi Castillo-Hi & Glenn H. Snyder, Devices and Diseases:
How the IoT is Transforming Medtech, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (Sep. 11, 2015),
https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/focus/internet-of-things/iot-in-medical-devices-industry.html
[https://perma.cc/5JUA-8RW3]; Andrew Meola, How IoT & Smart Home Automation
Will Change the Way We Live, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2016, 4:44 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-smart-home-automation-2016-8 [https://perma.cc
/U7A8-7FGS].
17. Louis Columbus, Roundup of Internet of Things Forecasts and Market Estimates,
2016, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2016, 1:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2016
/11/27/roundup-of-internet-of-things-forecasts-and-market-estimates-2016/#50c87fef292d
[https://perma.cc/L8L9-KYDN].
18. Bauer et al., supra note 1; Meola, supra note 1.
19. Makker, supra note 2, at 897–98 (“The ubiquitous deployment of sensors form
[sic] the backbone of what has been dubbed the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT).”) Another
important aspect of some IoT applications is the ability of machines to communicate with
one another, as with autonomous vehicles, but that definition is less pertinent to our
discussion here.
20. Id. at 897.
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embedded into physical objects (the “Thing” of Internet of Things)
that in the past have not normally contained computational power or
internet connectivity.21 Streetlights with internet-connected cameras
are an increasingly common example of a visual IoT sensor.22 The
sensor is a necessary component of IoT because it collects data, and
that data collection opens up numerous useful applications.23
A similarly important part of the IoT definition is the storage
and processing of all that sensor data in the cloud. Cloud storage
allows the people who run sensor networks to harness the massive
amounts of data that IoT generates,24 and therefore enables the many
benefits that can come from the combination of “Big Data” analysis
and IoT devices.25 Cloud storage is also necessary because many IoT
devices have limited storage and computational power on the device
itself, so they require the cloud to function effectively.26
Police BWCs fit both parts of this definition of IoT. A BWC is a
camera and microphone typically worn near the officer’s front chest
pocket or head-mounted on eyewear or a helmet.27 As a camera, it is
a sensor by definition.28 In some cases, the audio-visual footage (the
21. In earlier work, Swire and co-authors proposed shifting the name to “Internet of
Devices,” to highlight the fact that the devices are connected to the internet, while many
“things” will remain unconnected (such as trees, to illustrate the point). RICHARD L.
RUTLEDGE ET AL., GA. INST. OF TECH., DEFINING THE INTERNET OF DEVICES:
PRIVACY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2014), https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream
/handle/1853/52020/plsc2014-IoD.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VSB-DQBR]. In this Article, the
authors use the now-pervasive term “Internet of Things.”
22. Lily Hay Newman, Sheesh, Even Streetlights Are Getting Cameras and Internet
Connections, SLATE (Oct. 2, 2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015
/10/02/ge_intelligent_lamp_posts_have_cameras_sensors_may_come_to_new_york_city.html
[https://perma.cc/6AD7-XRW4].
23. See Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things is Far Bigger Than Anyone Realizes,
WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/ [https://perma.cc
/BAK9-M49H].
24. Andrew Meola, The Roles of Cloud Computing and Fog Computing in the Internet
INSIDER
(Dec.
20,
2016,
5:11
PM),
of
Things
Revolution,
BUS.
http://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-cloud-computing-2016-10 [https://perma.cc
/4DB6-LRKS].
OFFICE
OF
THE
PRESIDENT,
BIG
DATA
5
(2014),
25. EXEC.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may
_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/44RE-YRJG].
26. Mike Chen, Why Cloud Computing is the Foundation of the Internet of Things,
THORN TECHS. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.thorntech.com/2017/02/cloud-computingfoundation-internet-things/ [https://perma.cc/DNV5-UGQ8].
27. VIVIAN HUNG, STEVEN BABIN & JACQUELINE COBERLY, A PRIMER ON BODYWORN CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (2016), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00Body-Worn-Cameras-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9D5-TN8R].
28. Camera, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (3d ed. 1993).
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data) may be stored locally on the camera and later uploaded to a
central repository,29 but newer models upload or stream the data
directly to the cloud.30 The data may stream directly to the cloud or
through another piece of equipment such as the patrol car.31 Axon
(formerly Taser), the largest BWC manufacturer, also offers data
storage and processing services where the company can manage and
analyze the footage for police departments.32 Like some other IoT
manufacturers, Axon has evolved from a producer of hardware to a
“data as a service” vendor by maintaining the cloud services for BWC
data.33 In short, BWCs are examples of IoT devices—they have
sensors and their data is generally stored and analyzed remotely,
typically in the cloud. Use of BWCs is beginning to migrate from the
policing context into other sectors, including healthcare and
education.34 This expansion of BWC deployment also fits the
conceptual model of BWCs as a type of general purpose IoT device
rather than a pure policing tool.
Having established that BWCs qualify as a type of IoT
application, the next two Sections will demonstrate how the BWC and
IoT literatures identify similar privacy and cybersecurity issues.
Section I.B introduces the privacy and cybersecurity concerns
presented in the BWC literature. In brief, these concerns are the

29. A model where data is recorded and later uploaded to the cloud from a central
access point does not perfectly fit the definition of IoT, but the analogy that a distributed
network of sensors funnel data back to a central point for storage and processing does fit.
30. See Matt Stroud, Taser Plans to Livestream Police Body Camera Footage to the
Cloud by 2017, MOTHERBOARD (July 18, 2016, 3:06 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en
_us/article/4xa43g/taser-axon-police-body-camera-livestream [https://perma.cc/DZD5-YJFN].
Facial recognition is another emerging capability of BWCs that raises privacy concerns,
but it is not yet widespread. Id.
31. See Matt Stroud, The Company That’s Livestreaming Police Body Camera
(July
27,
2016,
6:00
AM),
Footage
Right
Now,
MOTHERBOARD
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/9a3ddv/visual-labs-police-body-camera-livestream
[https://perma.cc/P7DE-DPB3].
32. Alex Pasternack, Why Taser Changed Its Name and Offered Every Cop A Body
Camera, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40402050/taseraxon-police-body-cameras-video-evidence-data [https://perma.cc/4UY5-W25W].
33. Id.
34. Our research to date has discovered these deployments in the United Kingdom.
Sarah Knapton & Peter Walker, Doctors and Nurses Could be Issued with Body Cameras
to Record Violent Patients, TELEGRAPH (May 5, 2017) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science
/2017/05/05/doctors-nurses-could-issued-on-body-cameras-record-violent-patients/ [https://perma.cc
/N515-QBYY]; Rozina Sabur, Teachers Wearing Body Cameras to Control Students’
Behavior in New Trial, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 8, 2017) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017
/02/08/teachers-wearing-body-cameras-control-students-behaviour-new/ [https://perma.cc
/Y86Y-93SV].
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challenge of ubiquitous sensors to privacy in public and private
spaces; the difficulties with consent, raising trade-offs between
privacy and transparency; and the security of digital evidence
gathering tools. Section I.C will show how these issues relate to IoT.

B.

BWCs Raise Privacy and Cybersecurity Issues

BWCs pose challenges for privacy in both public and private
spaces. Private spaces are those where a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, such as inside a home or a bathroom.35 Public
spaces are locations where individuals do not possess a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and from where they are generally not able to
exclude others.36 The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Bureau of
Justice Assistance writes that “[p]rivacy rights of the public are a
primary concern” for BWCs.37 As BWCs are more widely deployed,
“ever larger amounts of personal information (both video and audio)
are being collected in increasingly diverse circumstances (both static
and mobile) with the potential of being linked with yet other personal
information (e.g., facial recognition, metadata).”38 Deploying BWCs
on just fifty officers could generate the equivalent of 1.6 million
feature-length movies in just three months.39 Similar widespread
recording by new technology is beginning to challenge traditional
legal limits of privacy in public spaces.40
Moreover, BWCs can also infringe on the privacy of private
spaces. The Police Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) warns that
“while stationary surveillance cameras generally cover only public
spaces, body-worn cameras give officers the ability to record inside
private homes and to film sensitive situations that might emerge

35. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. See id.
37. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BODY-WORN
CAMERA TOOLKIT FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6 (2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc
/pdfs/bwc_faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L4D-HBJ6].
38. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN. ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
39. See St. John Barned-Smith, As Authorities Study Use of Body Cameras, Logistical
Concerns Mount, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news
/houston-texas/houston/article/As-authorities-study-use-of-body-cameras-6201620.php
[https://perma.cc/M2RZ-JGF6].
40. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(2017) (No. 16-402).
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during calls for service.”41 Advocates and the media have raised
concerns about BWCs in private homes42 and other private spaces,
such as locker rooms.43
Another problem is whether and how to obtain consent to
record, an issue closely related to the rules governing when BWCs are
turned on and off. Obtaining consent before recording data is a
longstanding and important privacy principle, embodied in widely
accepted best practices like the Fair Information Practices.44 If BWCs
are always recording or recording by default, individuals may be
unable to express their preferences about being on video before they
are recorded. PERF notes that always-on recording may interfere
with “routine and casual situations” that constitute community
policing, or infringe on the privacy rights of victims or witnesses.45
Consent can also be an issue for bystanders, who may not know they
have been recorded by a BWC at all or may learn about the recording
after the fact, when a video is made public.
Scholars and advocates have varied in how they trade off this
privacy principle, the gathering of consent by those whose data is
collected, with the goal of transparency. There are important reasons
to release camera footage to the public to support police transparency
and accountability, including to document possible police
misconduct.46 Some states have emphasized the importance of privacy
by limiting the public disclosure of police BWC footage, citing privacy

41. LINDSAY MILLER & JESSICA TOLIVER, POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 11 (2014), http://www.policeforum.org
/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20a%20body-worn%20camera
%20program.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW8H-WKTD].
42. Matthew Feeney, Police Body Cameras Raise Privacy Issues for Cops and the
Public, CATO INST. (Feb. 12, 2015, 1:27 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/police-bodycameras-raise-privacy-issues-cops-public [https://perma.cc/9CJF-UY5J].
43. Cops’ Body Cameras Raise Privacy Concerns, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 15, 2014,
6:24 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/cops-body-cameras-raise-privacyconcerns-article-1.1722969 [https://perma.cc/9TJM-F6VA (dark archive)].
44. See ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES 3 (2017),
https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8Y7-8JYM]; see also
OECD Privacy Principles, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://oecdprivacy.org/ [https://perma.cc/C4R8-P387].
45. MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 41, at 12.
46. See Fan, supra note 10, at 410; Kelly Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling:
Privacy Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J. L. & SOC.
PROBS. 91, 95 (2015).
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concerns.47 Some scholars and advocates have disagreed with this
approach, emphasizing the need for transparency.48 According to one
survey, police policies governing BWC use generally agree that
certain locations are linked to an expectation of privacy where
cameras should not record, particularly bathrooms.49 Professor Mary
Fan writes that “[t]he widespread consensus on restrooms is not
surprising given that concerns about recording officers in bathrooms
were often raised by police unions.”50
The position of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)
illustrates the topic’s difficulty. The ACLU’s stance has evolved over
time for addressing the twin goals of privacy and transparency. The
ACLU originally called for recording of all encounters with the public
to maximize the accountability for officers.51 It has since modified its
position, however, to account for privacy. The ACLU now accepts
cameras being turned off in some instances, while supporting cameras
being turned on by default and remaining active for the duration of
“any other law enforcement or investigative encounter” with the
public.52 This Article does not seek to provide a general resolution to
the question of how to achieve the goals of both privacy and
transparency. The debate is noted here and Part III emphasizes that
consideration of transparency that we believe deserves greater
attention within the general IoT literature.
A third important consideration for BWCs is the cybersecurity of
the data they generate. Cybersecurity, defined as “measures taken to
protect a computer or computer system (as on the Internet) against
unauthorized access or attack,”53 is a growing concern as police
departments grapple with increasing amounts of digital evidence. The
International Association of Chiefs of Police warns that “[t]here is an
ever-growing risk of law enforcement organizations being the target
47. THE MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC, POLICE BODY CAM FOOTAGE
16–17
(2015),
http://isp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/publications/police_body_camera
_footage-_just_another_public_record.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9SK-GNF7].
48. See Fan, supra note 10, at 410.
49. Id. at 429.
50. Id.
51. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 2.
52. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A MODEL ACT FOR REGULATING THE USE OF
WEARABLE
BODY
CAMERAS
BY
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
§ 1(b)
(2017),
https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearable-body-cameras-law-enforcement
?redirect=files/field_document/aclu_police_body_cameras_model_legislation_may_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UHT4-WN6U].
53. Cybersecurity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/G4UX-WELV].
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of a cyber-attack.”54 Risks include exposure of confidential
information, denial of service attacks, ransomware, and tampering
with evidence.55 Experts warn that the databases that house digital
evidence such as BWC footage are vulnerable to attack.56 When
evidence is digitized and stored as data, it becomes vulnerable to the
same types of attacks that plague other types of digital data. These
vulnerabilities not only create privacy risks for the subjects of BWC
footage and others but could impact the chain of custody and
evidentiary value of data in the event of a hack,57 which could imperil
prosecutions. Police departments thus face the challenge, shared by
other organizations that hold personal data, of how to use their
available resources to respond as well as possible to the wide range of
possible cyberattacks. To assist police departments in responding to
these risks, Part II examines IoT best practices for cybersecurity and
privacy.
C.

The IoT Literature’s Analysis of Similar Privacy and
Cybersecurity Concerns

This Section summarizes key points from the extensive literature
on how to address privacy and security concerns for the IoT. This
literature has already addressed the three topics just discussed for
BWCs: the challenge of ubiquitous sensors to privacy in public and
private spaces, difficulties with consent, and security of digital
evidence gathering tools. By demonstrating that the issues are similar,
this Article indicates how some of the responses provided in that
literature can apply to BWCs as well.
As with BWCs, scholars have studied how ubiquitous recording
by IoT devices creates privacy issues both in public and in private.
IoT devices accumulate types of data not previously collected and do
so in ever greater volumes, thus revealing in unprecedented ways how
people move through public spaces.58 The extensive literature on
54. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, MANAGING CYBERSECURITY RISK 2 (2017),
http://www.iacpcybercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Managing_Cybersecurity_Risk
_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET45-ZTAY].
55. Id.
56. Steven Melendez, Police Departments Are Vulnerable to Cyberthreats As Evidence
Goes Digital, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3055955
/police-departments-are-vulnerable-to-cyber-threats-as-evidence-goes-digital [https://perma.cc
/J6GX-L679].
57. MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 41, at 44.
58. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 816 n.71 (2016).
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“smart city” technology directly applies to BWC issues. “Smart city”
technologies include audio gunshot recorders and streetlights with onboard, internet-connected cameras, and this information gathering
raises many of the same issues as BWCs.59 As IoT devices enter the
home, consumers lose privacy in those previously private spaces.60 For
instance, the FTC recently published a consent decree with a fine of
$3.2 million against a smart TV manufacturer for deceiving
consumers about its practice of tracking personal information via the
TV set.61 Risks come not only from consumer devices like smart
thermometers and speakers but also from technology that is less
visible to the consumer, such as smart utility meters.62 The IoTgenerated data streaming from intimate spaces combined with Big
Data can reveal surprisingly sensitive and personal information.63
When police wear a BWC into a house, the camera and microphone
of the BWC become examples of IoT devices within the home.
The IoT literature has extensively analyzed how IoT may
challenge the notice and consent model (requiring the entity
collecting data to first provide notice and obtain consent) that for
years has been a pillar of privacy law.64 Scholars have noted that
because many IoT devices—like connected pacemakers or traffic
lights—lack a screen or other user interface, providing meaningful
notice and consent can be a challenge.65 In addition, when IoT devices
are deployed in public spaces, individuals lack a meaningful choice to
opt-out or withdraw consent from tracking because doing so would
require withdrawing from the public sphere.66 This lack of a clear
consent mechanism is similar to the issues discussed above, where
59. See, e.g., Jesse W. Woo, Smart Cities Pose Privacy Risks and Other Problems, But
That Doesn’t Mean We Shouldn’t Build Them, 85 UMKC L. REV. 953, 955 (2017).
60. Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things,
51 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 641 (2015).
61. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 8–9, Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2017), 2017 WL 7000553,
at *4.
62. See Getting a Grip on the Grid, HORTONWORKS, https://hortonworks.com
/solutions/energy/ [https://perma.cc/4RVY-M77W].
63. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 25, at 5.
64. See GELLMAN, supra note 44, at 21–22 (noting that “notice and choice” does not
meet fair information practices such as data quality, enforcement, and access).
65. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 140–141 (2014); Jones,
supra note 60, at 640.
66. See Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy
in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1582, 1596 (2014); Woo, supra
note 59, at 965.
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bystanders or other individuals who are recorded by BWCs often lack
an opportunity to consent.
Just as experts are beginning to worry about the cybersecurity of
BWCs and other digital evidence, experts have already developed a
large and growing literature on IoT cybersecurity.67 In a prominent
example, hundreds of thousands of IoT devices were hacked and used
to launch a distributed denial of service (“DDoS”) attack that harmed
significant parts of the internet infrastructure.68 There have already
been numerous accounts of IoT home cameras or children’s toys left
vulnerable to attack or spying.69 Part of the reason IoT devices are so
insecure is that they are produced by manufacturers who lack
experience or expertise in computer security.70 There are also
technical challenges to strong IoT cybersecurity; for instance, devices
may lack the computational power to perform complex encryption or
other security measures.71 While this security environment appears
bleak, there is a growing body of expert literature on security best
practices that, if implemented properly, promises to substantially
reduce this risk.72 Because IoT security issues have arisen already for
a wide range of industries,73 other IoT sectors have developed
67. See generally Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology:
Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J. L. &
TECH. 1 (2015) (discussing cybersecurity issues presented by IoT technology as it relates to
“wearable” items).
68. Michael Kan, An IoT Botnet is Partly Behind Friday’s Massive DDOS Attack, PC
WORLD (Oct. 21, 2016, 4:21 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/3134056/hacking/an-iotbotnet-is-partly-behind-fridays-massive-ddos-attack.html [https://perma.cc/98FZ-6SNW].
69. See, e.g., Consumer Notice: Internet-Connected Toys Could Present Privacy and
Contact Concerns for Children, FBI (July 17, 2017) https://www.ic3.gov/media/2017
/170717.aspx [https://perma.cc/7NSE-5BWV]; Samuel Gibbs, Hackers Can Hijack Wi-Fi
Barbie to Spy on Your Children, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2015, 6:16 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/26/hackers-can-hijack-wi-fi-hello-barbieto-spy-on-your-children [https://perma.cc/ZXT7-Y5UB]; Elisabeth Leamy, The Danger of
Giving
Your
Child
‘Smart
Toys’,
WASH.
POST
(Sep.
29,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/on-parenting/giving-your-child-internet-connected
-smart-toys-could-be-dumb/2017/09/29/a168218a-a241-11e7-8cfe-d5b912fabc99_story.html
[https://perma.cc/PV87-MD9A].
70. Peppet, supra note 65, at 135.
71. See Chris James, Cybersecurity Law and the Internet of Things, SOC’Y FOR
COMPUTERS & L. (June 6, 2016, 4:58 PM), https://www.scl.org/articles/3670-cybersecuritylaw-and-the-internet-of-things [http://perma.cc/R89G-GKJB].
72. See generally BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3
(analyzing cybersecurity concerns and security practices to alleviate those concerns).
73. From Connected Cars, Healthcare to Uranium Enrichment Facilities, 5 IoT Security
Hacking Instances to Take Note of!, EMBITEL: EMBEDDED BLOG (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www.embitel.com/blog/embedded-blog/security-challenges-faced-by-iot-based-industries
[https://perma.cc/5PAD-U8B7].
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experience about categories of attacks and best practices for
mitigating the risks.
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated how police BWCs
technologically match the definition of IoT devices—sensors
connected to the storage in the cloud.74 The two literatures—about
IOT and police BWCs—have identified similar privacy and
cybersecurity issues.75 To date, however, the IoT literature has largely
ignored the connection with BWCs, and vice versa.76 Neither body of
literature has explored how the lessons from each side—IoT and
BWC—inform policy and best practices for the other. Part II of this
Article will present lessons from IoT for BWCs. Part III presents
lessons from BWCs for IoT.
II. IOT BEST PRACTICES APPLIED TO POLICE BWCS
This Part explains IoT privacy and security best practices from
expert organizations in the field. BITAG,77 the Microsoft
Corporation,78 and the FTC,79 each a major stakeholder with an
established expertise in IoT privacy and security, have offered privacy
and security best practices.80 This Section briefly analyzes the
recommendations from each source and explains whether and how
they apply to police BWCs. Each set of this Article’s best practices is
listed in their entirety to give readers a sense of the universe of
recommendations in the IoT literature. This Article’s hope is to
identify applicable best practices for police departments and policy
makers to make informed decisions, not to create the definitive guide
for BWC privacy and security.

74. See supra Section I.A.
75. See supra Section I.B.
76. Adam Thierer identified BWCs as a type of IoT wearable device that raised
heightened privacy concerns because of the Fourth Amendment. He did not, however,
extensively discuss the implications of the two literatures for each other. Thierer, supra
note 67, at 28–29, 115–17.
77. See generally BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3
(suggesting practices for avoiding cybersecurity risks with IoT devices and software).
78. See generally Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4 (discussing security strategies for IoT
infrastructures).
79. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5 (providing recommendations to
protect consumers from security risks related to IoT).
80. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW
AND POLICY 230–31 (2016).
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A. BITAG: Internet of Things Security and Privacy
Recommendations
BITAG is a group that brings “together engineers and other
similar technical experts to develop consensus on broadband network
management practices or other related technical issues.”81 It is
composed of experts from both academia and industry.82 Its report on
IoT security and privacy is a leading expert resource, especially for
security best practices.83
1. “IoT Devices Should Use Best Current Software Practices”84
a. “IoT Devices Should Ship With Reasonably Current
Software”85
“BITAG recommends that IoT devices should ship to customers
or retail outlets with reasonably current software that does not
contain severe, known vulnerabilities.”86 Because IoT devices are
physical objects embedded with computers, they operate using
computer software.87 BITAG recommends that this software be
reasonably current because software is constantly being updated and
improved.88 Running older versions of software creates a security risk,
and shipping IoT devices with outdated software places these devices
in the market with already lagging security.89
Like other IoT devices, BWCs run on software to record video
and typically to transmit those recordings to the cloud.90 BWCs with
outdated software or known vulnerabilities leave the devices
susceptible to hacking.91 Such vulnerabilities could compromise the

81. See BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3.
82. Technical Participants, BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GROUP,
http://bitag.org/tech_work_group.php?action=participants [https://perma.cc/3NSG-RMPN].
83. See Josephine Wolff, Coalition Seeks to Protect Internet From Weaknesses of Many
‘Connected’ Devices, PRINCETON U. (Nov. 22, 2016, 1:07 PM), https://www.princeton.edu
/news/2016/11/22/coalition-seeks-protect-internet-weaknesses-many-connected-devices
[https://perma.cc/HD3S-NE7D].
84. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 18.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra text accompanying note 21.
88. Deb Shinder, The Risk of Running Obsolete Software (Part 1), TECHGENIX (Feb.
24, 2016), http://techgenix.com/risk-running-obsolete-software-part1/ [https://perma.cc
/2WDJ-UVRG].
89. Id.
90. See supra Section I.A.
91. See Shinder, supra note 88.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1475 (2018)

2018]

PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY LESSONS

1491

BWCs themselves or, possibly worse, expose a police department’s
entire network.92 Hacking and exposure of BWC footage or other
evidence could also violate the privacy of victims, suspects, witnesses,
or officers.93 BWCs may be in service for long periods of time
depending on the financial resources of the police department,94 so
purchasing cameras with the most current software will help ensure
security over the life of the device.
b. “IoT Devices Should Have a Mechanism for Automated,
Secure Software Updates”95
According to BITAG, IoT manufacturers should “design systems
and processes to ensure the automatic update of IoT device software,
without requiring or expecting any type of user action or even user
opt-in.”96 No software is perfect, bugs that impact security or privacy
are widespread, and attackers constantly develop new attacks.97 This
reality will continue to hold true for IoT devices that run software and
are connected to the internet.98 IoT patchability is important enough
that the Department of Commerce through the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration has engaged in
a multi-stakeholder process to ensure IoT security upgradability and
patching.99
BWCs run on software to digitally record and transmit video,100
and that software will need to be patched to maintain security. This
recommendation clearly applies to BWCs.

92. Id.
93. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 54, at 2.
94. See, e.g., ANNE FRANCES JOHNSON & LYNETTE I. MILLET, NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., SOFTWARE UPDATE AS A MECHANISM FOR RESILIENCE AND
SECURITY: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP 61–62 (2017), https://www.nap.edu/catalog
/24833/software-update-as-a-mechanism-for-resilience-and-security-proceedings
[http://perma.cc/2VAB-QY5K (staff-uploaded archive)].
95. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 18.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See supra Section I.A.
99. Multistakeholder Process; Internet of Things (IoT) Security Upgradability and
Patching, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COM.,
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2016/multistakeholder-process-iot-security
[https://perma.cc/9HGA-P8JN]; see also JOHNSON & MILLET, supra note 94, at 60–61.
100. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Solutions for Law
Enforcement, AXON, https://www.axon.com/solutions/law-enforcement [http://perma.cc
/2BDZ-L5JP].
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c. “IoT Devices Should Use Strong Authentication by
Default”101
“BITAG recommends that IoT devices be secured by default
(e.g. password protected) and not use common or easily guessable
user names and passwords (e.g., ‘admin,’ ‘password’).”102
Authentication is necessary to determine when an individual is
permitted to use or modify an IoT device.103 Weak authentication can
allow unauthorized users to access sensitive data collected by IoT
devices.104
As a result, strong authentication is a best practice with
traditional computing as well as IoT,105 and the practice should apply
to BWCs too. It is necessary to protect the potentially sensitive data
collected by BWCs and provide assurance about the integrity of data
when used as evidence. Strong passwords should protect access to the
camera footage stored in the cloud,106 and possibly to the BWC as
well.
d. “IoT Device Configurations Should Be Tested and
Hardened”107
“BITAG recommends that manufacturers test the security of
each device with a range of possible configurations, as opposed to
simply the default configuration.”108 Testing device software for
vulnerabilities is a vital means of ensuring security.109 Like other IoT
devices, BWCs and storage of camera footage should undergo
thorough testing, and the results of those tests should be incorporated

101. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 19.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Securing the Internet of Things: A Proposed Framework, CISCO,
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/secure-iot-proposed-framework.html#9a
[https://perma.cc/KW49-UPXX].
104. See Danny Palmer, Is ‘Admin’ Password Leaving Your IoT Device Vulnerable to
Cyberattacks?, ZDNET (Apr. 26, 2017, 3:10 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/is-adminpassword-leaving-your-iot-device-vulnerable-to-cyberattacks/ [https://perma.cc/M5DK-SG4E].
105. The Importance of User Authentication in Network Security, BROOKHAVEN
NAT’L
LABABORATORY,
https://www.bnl.gov/cybersecurity/networkaccess/strongauth.php [https://perma.cc/WFL6-LJSU].
106. See CLOUD STANDARDS CUSTOMER COUNCIL, SECURITY FOR CLOUD
COMPUTING TEN STEPS TO ENSURE SUCCESS 14 (2017), http://www.cloudcouncil.org/deliverables/CSCC-Security-for-Cloud-Computing-10-Steps-to-Ensure-Success.pdf
[http://perma.cc/MZ5D-88B4].
107. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 19.
108. Id.
109. See CLOUD STANDARDS CUSTOMER COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 22–23.
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back into the camera and storage system to iteratively improve
security. Where police departments lack the institutional capacity to
conduct such testing, they may contract for thorough testing from
their vendors or third parties.110
2. “IoT Devices Should Follow Security & Cryptography Best
Practices”111
BITAG recommends that IoT devices use security best practices
when transmitting and storing data.112 This recommendation includes
using strong encryption, having unique credentials for every device,
and disabling unnecessary devices and services.113 The full list covers
the following:
(a) Encrypt Configuration (Command & Control)
Communications by Default
(b) Secure Communications to and from IoT Controllers
(c) Encrypt Local Storage of Sensitive Data
(d) Authenticate Communications, Software Changes, and
Requests for Data
(e) Use Unique Credentials for Each Device
(f) Use Credentials That Can Be Updated
(g) Close Unnecessary Ports and Disable Unnecessary
Services
(h) Use Libraries That Are Actively Maintained and
Supported114
These best practices are tailored to IoT devices that collect and
transmit sensitive data. Given the potentially sensitive nature of BWC
footage (it may include violent crimes or video of individual
homes),115 they should apply to police BWCs as well. Camera footage
and other sensitive information should be encrypted, which basically
means that footage is electronically locked away.116 Police

110. See, e.g., Security of the Axon Network, AXON, https://www.axon.com/trust
/security [https://perma.cc/3DZ5-GXNS].
111. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 19.
112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. at 20–21.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
116. David Nield, Why You Should Be Encrypting Your Devices and How to Easily Do
It, GIZMODO: FIELD GUIDE (Sept. 4, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://fieldguide.gizmodo.com/whyyou-should-be-encrypting-your-devices-and-how-to-ea-1798698901 [http://perma.cc/YXH4
-BDJS].

96 N.C. L. REV. 1475 (2018)

1494

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

departments should consult with security experts and demand best
practices from their vendors.
3. “IoT Devices Should Be Restrictive Rather Than Permissive in
Communicating”117
“BITAG recommends [w]hen possible, devices should not be
reachable via inbound connections by default.”118 This
recommendation is designed to limit the number of potential
vulnerabilities or means of attack (what the security community calls
the “attack surface”).119 Creating additional, unnecessary points of
entry creates more opportunities for attackers to hack into devices.120
Similarly, BWCs should only communicate with other devices
when necessary. For example, BWCs will need to connect to the
cloud directly or via the officer’s squad car.121 They may not need to
connect to public Wi-Fi networks or Bluetooth devices that could
open the devices up to attack, so such connections should exist only if
clearly justified in a particular setting.122
4. “IoT Devices Should Continue to Function if Internet
Connectivity is Disrupted”123
“BITAG recommends that an IoT device should be able to
perform its primary function or functions (for example, a light switch
or a thermostat should continue to function with manual controls),
even if it is not connected to the Internet.”124 BITAG is concerned
that connectivity outages will unnecessarily render devices useless.125
Devices may lose connectivity for a variety of reasons such as
“accidental misconfiguration or intentional attack (e.g. denial of
service attack).”126 Internet connectivity may add functions to light
switches or thermostats, but the loss of connectivity should not

117. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 21.
118. Id.
119. Id.; Lily Hay Newman, Hacker Lexicon: What is an Attack Surface?, WIRED (Mar.
12, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/hacker-lexicon-attack-surface/
[http://perma.cc/57DX-NVVS].
120. Newman, supra note 119.
121. See Axon Body 2, AXON, https://www.axon.com/products/body-2 [https://perma.cc/
P7MY-M4ST]; supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
122. See Axon Body 2, supra note 121.
123. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 21.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
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disable these devices entirely; they should just revert to being normal
light switches or thermostats.127
This recommendation applies to BWCs, which should continue
to function even when internet connectivity is lost. Police officers
enter a wide variety of locations in the course of their work, including
underground rooms and other places that may not receive a wireless
signal. By continuing to function even in such places, BWCs can
continue to serve the policy goals of transparency and accountability
during temporary internet outages.128 Footage may be recorded and
uploaded at a later time, as with older generation cameras. In short, a
BWC should still function as a regular camera even without internet
connectivity.
5. “IoT Devices Should Continue to Function if the Cloud Back-End
Fails”129
This recommendation is similar to the previous one. It
recommends that if the cloud back-end (the computer server that
stores and processes data from the IoT device)130 fails, the device
should continue to operate, even if its functionality is partially
reduced as a result.131 As with the previous recommendation, this
should also apply to BWCs.
6. “IoT Devices Should Support Addressing and Naming Best
Practices”132
BITAG recommends that IoT devices use the latest protocols—
the “languages” by which devices communicate with one another133—
to ensure that devices are secure and functional for as long as

127. But see Nick Bilton, Nest Thermostat Glitch Leaves Users in the Cold, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/fashion/nest-thermostat-glitchbattery-dies-software-freeze.html [https://perma.cc/QUK6-YK7X (dark archive)].
128. See USSD Platform & Gateway – USSD+, MYRIAD CONNECT,
http://connect.myriadgroup.com/products/ussd/ [https://perma.cc/K3AV-JAM5] (detailing
a software program allowing secure transfers of communications by mobile devices
without internet connection).
129. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 22.
130. Back-end
and
API
Development,
LEMBERG
SOLUTIONS,
https://lemberg.co.uk/services/back-end-and-api-development [https://perma.cc/F5Z4-U8EB].
131. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 22.
132. Id.
133. Bradley Mitchell, Network Protocols, LIFEWIRE (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.lifewire.com/definition-of-protocol-network-817949 [https://perma.cc/78G7-5ARG].
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possible.134 Specifically, BITAG refers to the internet protocol version
6 and the Domain Name System Security Extension.135
Like other IoT devices, BWCs will communicate with a cloud
server and possibly other devices.136 They should do so with up-todate protocols to ensure security for as long as possible.
7. “IoT Devices Should Ship with a Privacy Policy That is Easy to
Find & Understand”137
“BITAG recommends that IoT devices ship with a privacy
policy, but that policy must be easy for a typical user to find and
understand.”138 Although the privacy of the BWC user (the officer) is
important, a major public policy concern for this Article is the privacy
of the subjects of the camera, the general public.139 Having a publicly
available, plain language privacy policy on a website, physical signs,
or mailers enables concerned citizens to remain informed and
engaged with BWC privacy issues.140
8. “Disclose Rights to Remotely Decrease IoT Device
Functionality”141
“BITAG recommends that if the functionality of an IoT device
can be remotely decreased by a third party, such as by the
manufacturer or IoT service provider, this possibility should be made
clear to the user at the time of purchase.”142 This recommendation is
aimed at consumer devices, where the concern is that companies will
remotely decrease device functionality and deprive consumers of the
service they paid for.143 It may not be relevant to BWC privacy or
cybersecurity because police officers are not the same kinds of
consumers of commercial products—for one thing the individual
officers do not pay for the device.144 However, police departments
134. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 22.
135. Id.
136. See supra Section I.A.
137. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 22.
138. Id.
139. See supra Section I.B.
140. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 26–27, 39 n.159.
141. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 22.
142. Id.
143. Cf. Jason Perlow, All Your IoT Devices Are Doomed, ZDNET (July 12, 2016),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/all-your-iot-devices-are-doomed/ [https://perma.cc/W685-4UBX].
144. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Awards Over $20
Million to Law Enforcement Body-Worn Camera Programs (Sept. 26, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-awards-over-20-million-law-enforcement-
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may wish to inquire of their vendors about the ability of third parties
to remotely decrease BWC functionality. Some police departments
have expressed frustration with how third-party vendors handle their
data analytics functions for investigative and other purposes,145 so
departments may want to prevent similar frustration in the BWC
context.
9. “The IoT Device Industry Should Consider an Industry
Cybersecurity Program”146
BITAG recommends “an industry-backed program under which
some kind of ‘Secure IoT Device’ logo or notation could be carried
on IoT retail packaging.”147 As this Article is concerned with BWCs
sold to police departments and not the general public, the usefulness
of a mark or certification on retail packaging is not similarly
applicable. It may be useful, however, for police departments to
participate in an industry-wide set of best practices for BWCs as a
check against possible business, privacy, and cybersecurity problems
arising from relations with vendors. Developing an industry-wide set
of best practices, for police departments to check their vendors’
practices against, would still be useful. Hopefully, such an
organization would help raise the bar for privacy and security across
the BWC manufacturing industry. Organizations including PERF or
the U.S. DOJ might encourage or promulgate such best practices and
distribute them through existing networks.
10. “The IoT Supply Chain Should Play Their Part in Addressing IoT
Security and Privacy Issues”148
BITAG notes that “[e]nd users of IoT devices depend upon the
IoT supply chain to protect their security and privacy, and some or all
parts of that IoT supply chain play a critical role throughout the
entire lifecycle of the product.”149 The supply chain is important
body-worn-camera-programs [https://perma.cc/N7SN-6GMR]. But see Dan Sewell, Cops
Buying Body Cameras on Their Own, POLICEONE (Apr. 23, 2015),
https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/8531889-Cops-buyingbody-cameras-on-their-own/ [https://perma.cc/E6HP-GBNQ].
145. Mark Harris, How Peter Thiel’s Secretive Data Company Pushed Into Policing,
WIRED (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-peter-thiels-secretivedata-company-pushed-into-policing/ [https://perma.cc/ER6U-MM2N].
146. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 23.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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because if it is vulnerable, malware may be introduced on the factory
floor, or during shipping, or on the retail shelf.150 Similarly, BWC
manufacturers will play a large role in how their cameras ensure
security and privacy. This is especially true if the device manufacturer
also provides data processing and cloud management services to the
police department.151 Those manufacturers will have a great deal of
control over both the device as it moves through the supply chain and
the data once the camera is in the field.152 BITAG recommends the
following practices for the supply chain:
(a) “a privacy policy that is clear and understandable;”
(b) a reset mechanism to clear all configurations and delete
or reset data;
(c) “a bug reporting system;”
(d) a “secure software supply chain;”
(e) support for devices for their entire lifespan;
(f) a method for consumers to contact the manufacturer as
well as for manufacturers to inform consumers of
vulnerabilities;
(g) disclosure and remediation of software vulnerabilities;
and
(h) “a vulnerability reporting process” that is easy to find
and use.153
Having a reset mechanism to easily delete data may not be
advisable for police BWCs, due to legal reasons to preserve video
footage for evidentiary or transparency purposes.154 However, the
other recommendations are apt. BWC manufacturers should maintain
bug reporting systems and other methods to take feedback from users
on bugs and security vulnerabilities. They should secure their supply
chain to ensure that malware is not inserted into devices in the
manufacturing process. Further, they should support BWCs with
security patches and updates for the entire life of the camera.

150. See Tobias Naegele, IOT Security Risks Begin with Supply Chains,
GOVTECHWORKS (July 12, 2017), https://www.govtechworks.com/iot-security-risks-beginwith-supply-chains/#gs.dnQYaBo [https://perma.cc/AP5A-2DQ5].
151. See Choose the Network, Not the Camera, AXON (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://www.axon.com/company/news/choose-the-network-not-a-camera [https://perma.cc
/GCK7-UD2U].
152. See id.
153. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 23–24.
154. See, e.g., Richard Lin, Police Body Worn Cameras and Privacy: Retaining Public
Benefits While Reducing Public Concerns, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. J. 347, 363 (2016).
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In summary, BITAG has created best practices based on expert
experience with the privacy and cybersecurity threats that exist in
connection with broadband services.155 These broadband internet
services exist for BWCs as well—sensors connected to the cloud
through the high-bandwidth transmissions required for video
footage.156 The BITAG recommendations thus provide a useful
checklist for issues that may arise for management of BWCs.
B.

Microsoft: “Internet of Things [S]ecurity [B]est [P]ractices”157

As a leading technology company that has invested heavily in
security and privacy over time,158 Microsoft possesses a great deal of
expertise on emerging technologies like IoT. This Article chooses to
highlight this set of recommendations because of its focus on physical
as well as digital security. Physical security is an important aspect of
cybersecurity, as physical access may enable an attack to gain access
to systems that would otherwise be difficult to crack.159
Microsoft classifies its recommendations based on the four IoT
stakeholders.160 The “hardware manufacturer[s]/integrator[s]” are
those who build or assemble the physical devices.161 The “solution
developers” design the device functionality; they build the software.162
The “solution deployer” installs the devices and connects them to
each other and/or to the cloud.163 Finally, the “solution operator”
actually operates the devices in the long term.164 For BWCs, the
manufacturer and developer will likely be the vendor who supplies
the cameras.165 The deployer may be a third-party vendor, or that
function may occur within the department. The operators will be the
police department, possibly in cooperation with a third-party vendor.
The issues identified in the Microsoft best practices expand on the
155.
156.
157.
158.

Wolff, supra note 83.
See supra Section I.A.
Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
John Viega, Ten Years of Trustworthy Computing: Lessons Learned, IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 3, 3–4, https://www.computer.org/csdl/mags/sp
/2011/05/msp2011050003.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LWX-FFKD].
159. Paul McCormack, Why Physical Security Matters for Your Cybersecurity Efforts,
BOOST, ADP (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.adp.com/boost/articles/why-physical-securitymatters-for-your-cybersecurity-efforts-13-1745 [https://perma.cc/9U9F-6WHP].
160. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Wolff, supra note 83.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1475 (2018)

1500

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

BITAG recommendations, such as those concerning the IoT supply
chain.
1. “IoT hardware manufacturer/integrator”166
a.

“Scope hardware to minimum requirements”167

According to Microsoft, IoT “hardware design should include
the minimum features required for operation of the hardware, and
nothing more. An example is to include USB ports only if necessary
for the operation of the device. These additional features open the
device for unwanted attack vectors that should be avoided.”168
Manufacturers should design BWCs to reduce vulnerabilities and
attack vectors such as unnecessary USB ports.169 The purpose of the
camera is to capture video footage; creating additional methods to
access the device creates more ways to introduce malicious software
or otherwise tamper with the BWC.170
b.

“Make hardware tamper proof”171

Microsoft recommends that IoT manufacturers “[b]uild in
mechanisms to detect physical tampering, such as opening of the
device cover or removing a part of the device. These tamper signals
may be part of the data stream uploaded to the cloud, which could
alert operators of these events.”172
The need for tamper-proof IoT hardware is as great in the BWC
context as it is with regular IoT devices.173 BWCs implicate not only
the integrity of personal data but potentially criminal evidence as
well.174 Manufacturers should design hardware to resist tampering by
officers and third parties.

166. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Andy Greenberg, Why the Security of USB Is Fundamentally Broken, WIRED
(July 31, 2014, 3:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/07/usb-security/ [https://perma.cc
/G7LD-693G].
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Ben Dickson, Why IoT Security Is So Critical, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2015),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/24/why-iot-security-is-so-critical/ [https://perma.cc/H7WME6K8].
174. See supra Section I.B.
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“Build around secure hardware”175

Similar to BITAG,176 Microsoft recommends using encryption to
secure data storage and IoT devices themselves.177 This
recommendation applies to BWCs.
d.

“Make upgrades secure”178

Not only do IoT devices need regular patching to remain secure,
but the process for patching itself must not be compromised.179 For
example, the NotPetya attack that hit Ukraine in 2017 infiltrated
systems through an unsecured software update.180 Police departments
should consult security experts and require their vendors to use
secured update systems.
2. “IoT solution developer”181
a.

“Follow secure software development methodology”182

This recommendation is similar to the BITAG recommendation
to use software best practices.183 As stated above, it should apply to
police BWCs.
b.

“Choose open-source software with care”184

Microsoft recommends that “[w]hen choosing open-source
software, consider the activity level of the community for each opensource component.”185 Open-source software, where the source code
is publicly available, is community-driven by nature, so more active
communities are more likely to find and update software

175. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
176. See supra text accompanying note 116.
177. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
178. Id.
179. See Roger A. Grimes, Why Patching Is Still a Problem—And How to Fix It, CSO
(Jan. 26, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3025807/data-protection/whypatching-is-still-a-problem-and-how-to-fix-it.html [https://perma.cc/4L5R-RVMB].
180. Andy Greenberg, The Petya Plague Exposes the Threat of Evil Software Updates,
WIRED (July 7, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/petya-plague-automaticsoftware-updates/ [https://perma.cc/VRW4-6R9U].
181. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
182. Id.
183. See supra Section II.A.1.
184. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
185. Id.
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vulnerabilities.186 This recommendation illustrates how the best
practices from sources including Microsoft can provide questions that
police departments can pose to vendors during the BWC
procurement process.
c.

“Integrate with care”187

Microsoft suggests that software developers integrate different
capabilities into their IoT devices carefully.188 Creating additional
functionality introduces greater complexity, which creates more
opportunities for a vulnerability.189 The benefits of new features
should be weighed against the increased attack surface.190 This
recommendation applies to police BWCs and related software
vendors.
3. “IoT solution deployer”191
a.

“Deploy hardware securely”192

“IoT deployments may require hardware to be deployed in
unsecure locations, such as in public spaces or unsupervised locales.
In such situations, ensure that hardware deployment is tamper-proof
to the maximum extent. If USB or other ports are available on the
hardware, ensure that they are covered securely.”193
Police BWCs will, by their very nature, be deployed in public.194
It is important that they be deployed securely.195 For example,

186. See Maria Korolov, Open Source Software Security Challenges Persist, but the Risk
Can Be Managed, CSO (Jan. 10, 2018, 3:24 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article
/3157377/application-development/report-attacks-based-on-open-source-vulnerabilities-will
-rise-20-percent-this-year.html [https://perma.cc/A9YQ-W7EE].
187. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Jane Chong, Why Is Our Cybersecurity So Insecure?, NEW REPUBLIC
(Oct. 11, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115145/us-cybersecurity-why-software-soinsecure [https://perma.cc/MC8L-D8GJ].
190. See Newman, supra note 119.
191. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, A PRIMER ON BODY WORN CAMERA
TECHNOLOGIES
6
(2012),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250382.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9D5-TN8R].
195. See Padraig Scully, Understanding IoT Security – Part 1 of 3: IoT Security
Architecture on the Device and Communication Layers, IOT ANALYTICS (Nov. 29, 2016),
https://iot-analytics.com/understanding-iot-security-part-1-iot-security-architecture/ [http://perma.cc
/26KG-CGHE].
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cameras should not be left unattended in the open where they may be
tampered with.196
b.

“Keep authentication keys safe”197

“During deployment, each device requires device IDs and
associated authentication keys generated by the cloud service. Keep
these keys physically safe even after the deployment. Any
compromised key can be used by a malicious device to masquerade as
an existing device.”198
Police departments must maintain and keep track of BWCs like
any other hardware. If the cameras have unique device IDs and
authentication keys (as recommended), then those keys should be
physically secured and secluded.199 Most people know intuitively not
to leave their physical keys out in the open—the same logic applies to
digital keys.200 As police departments move toward uploading BWC
footage in real time, it becomes even more important to trust the
identification and authentication of individual BWCs.
4. “IoT solution operator”201
a.

“Keep the system up to date”202

Although automatic updates are a best practice in IoT, as noted
above by BITAG,203 if updates do not come automatically the device
user will need to ensure software is up to date.204
With BWCs, each device must be patched and updated.205 Police
departments must develop a system to do so, and decide whether
responsibility for patching devices falls on the individual officer or a
centralized information technology (“IT”) or quartermaster service.

196. Cybersecurity and IoT: Where Do We Go From Here?, SIA PARTNERS (Oct. 18,
2017), http://en.finance.sia-partners.com/20171018/cybersecurity-and-iot-where-do-we-gohere [https://perma.cc/FAS9-FYPP].
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See Physical Measures to Amp Up Your Digital Security, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/physical-security-measures/ [https://perma.cc/XS5Q-TNVK].
201. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
202. Id.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 95–96.
204. Cf. Updating Device Firmware, AXON, https://help.axon.com/hc/en-us/articles
/226850208-Updating-device-firmware [https://perma.cc/AX6R-UNGA].
205. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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“Protect against malicious activity”206

Microsoft recommends that, where possible, IoT devices should
run the latest software, including antivirus software.207
Whether BWCs are able to run antivirus software will depend on
design choices by the manufacturer.208 There is currently active
research on how to secure IoT devices with antivirus measures,209
which may or may not apply to BWCs. In any case, this
recommendation illustrates the importance of updated and secure
software, including for other parts of the IoT infrastructure that
connect to BWCs such as the cloud servers.210
c.

“Audit frequently”211

Microsoft says that frequent audits are “key when responding to
security incidents. Most operating systems provide built-in event
logging that should be reviewed frequently to make sure no security
breach has occurred. Audit information can be sent as a separate
telemetry stream to the cloud service where it can be analyzed.”212
BWC manufacturers and police departments should explore similar
capabilities for automatic auditing in their devices.213
d.

“Physically protect the IoT infrastructure”214

In the IOT context, “[t]he worst security attacks . . . are launched
using physical access to devices.”215 Therefore, an “important safety
practice is to protect against malicious use of USB ports and other

206. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
207. Id.
208. Cf. Liam Tung, Samsung: Here’s How We’re Securing Your Smart TV, ZDNET
(May 17, 2017, 10:44 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/samsung-heres-how-weresecuring-your-smart-tv/ [https://perma.cc/CZH9-JXJ6].
209. See, e.g., Dawn Lim, Startup Offers to Protect Printers, Phones, and Other Devices
from Hackers, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 21, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s
/511331/startup-offers-to-protect-printers-phones-and-other-devices-from-hackers/ [https://perma.cc
/3W7E-ZUSB].
210. E.g., Mike Borza, Hardware Roots of Trust for IoT Security, TECH DESIGN F.
(July 29, 2016), http://www.techdesignforums.com/practice/technique/hardware-roots-oftrust-for-iot-security/ [https://perma.cc/QXR3-S3QL].
211. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Change Auditor, QUEST, https://www.quest.com/change-auditor/
[https://perma.cc/727N-WXRH].
214. Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4.
215. Id.
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physical access. One key to uncovering breaches that might have
occurred is logging of physical access, such as USB port use.”216
In the BWC context, the IoT infrastructure includes the device,
the cloud servers, and any intermediate transmitting devices such as
the officer’s squad car.217 Each aspect of the infrastructure must be
physically as well as digitally protected.218 All the security in the world
for the camera itself becomes meaningless if an attacker can simply
walk into the server room where footage is stored and tamper with
the footage.
e.

“Protect cloud credentials”219

According to Microsoft, the passwords used to log in, configure,
and operate the IoT cloud “are possibly the easiest way to gain access
and compromise an IoT system.”220 The company recommends users
“change[] the password frequently, and refrain from using these
credentials on public machines.”221 Password management is a basic
part of cybersecurity222 and remains important for BWCs.
In summary, the Microsoft and BITAG sets of best practices are
generally consistent, but each contains a number of specific
recommendations not listed by the other. Taken together, they
provide a thorough set of recommendations for police departments to
consider when deploying BWCs.
C.

The Federal Trade Commission

The FTC is the leading U.S. regulator for consumer privacy
across sectors.223 It is a leading proponent of privacy best practices
generally and IoT privacy best practices more specifically.224 This
Section will discuss the FTC report Internet of Things: Privacy &
216. Id.
217. See supra Section I.A.
218. See Julian Lovelock, Aligning Physical and Digital Security in the Cloud, SOURCE
SECURITY, https://www.sourcesecurity.com/insights/aligning-physical-digital-security-todayincreasingly-connected-world-co-823-ga.22604.html [https://perma.cc/ML6U-Y2UX].
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Kenneth Olmstead & Aaron Smith, Password Management and Mobile
Security, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/2password-management-and-mobile-security/ [http://perma.cc/A3WF-TLYX].
223. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 80, at 73–81.
224. GEORGE CORSER ET AL., INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) SECURITY BEST
PRACTICES 2 (2017), https://internetinitiative.ieee.org/images/files/resources/white_papers
/internet_of_things_feb2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT8M-X8R9].
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Cybersecurity in a Connected World225 to identify recommendations
based on the FTC’s IoT expertise. It will also discuss some of the
more general FTC Privacy by Design recommendations that could
apply to IoT and BWCs. Broadly, the FTC recommends “data
security,” “data minimization,” “notice and choice,” and “privacy by
design.”226 The FTC has highlighted the role of administrative
controls, in addition to the technical and physical measures stressed
by BITAG and Microsoft.
1. Data Security
Like other leading organizations, the FTC stresses the
importance of cybersecurity to protect the data generated by IoT
devices.227 The report makes recommendations that are similar to
BITAG and Microsoft, such as access controls and patching.228 It
emphasizes “security by design,” where developers build “security
into their devices at the outset, rather than as an afterthought,”229 and
“defense-in-depth,” where “security measures are considered at
several levels” such as using a combination of network passwords and
encryption.230 All of the FTC’s security recommendations apply to
BWCs, but the recommendation to “retain service providers that are
capable of maintaining reasonable security”231 is particularly
applicable. Local police departments may lack deep cybersecurity
expertise, but they should demand good security from their vendors.
IoT’s reliance on the cloud can help in this regard, as cloud servers
can allow for secure storage at scale by organizations with
cybersecurity expertise.232
The full list of FTC IoT cybersecurity recommendations is
largely similar to the BITAG and Microsoft recommendations above:
(a) Security by Design233;
225. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5.
226. See id. at 27–35, 39–46.
227. Id. at 27–32.
228. Id. at 28–30.
229. Id. at 28–30.
230. Id. at 30.
231. Id.
CLOUD
PLATFORM,
232. See,
e.g.,
Device
Security,
GOOGLE
https://cloud.google.com/iot/docs/concepts/device-security [http://perma.cc/SM27-97M9]
(providing an example of storage offerings from a well-known cloud service provider). On
the other hand, a possible downside of cloud storage is that it may concentrate large pools
of data in one place, creating a more attractive target. See also FED. TRADE COMM’N,
supra note 5, at 33.
233. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 28.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1475 (2018)

2018]

PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY LESSONS

1507

(b) Ensure personnel practices promote good security234;
(c) Retain service providers that are capable of maintaining
reasonable security235;
(d) Defense-in-depth236;
(e) Reasonable access controls237; and
(f) Monitor and patch throughout the product’s life cycle.238
2. “Data Minimization”239
The FTC recommends companies apply a principle of data
minimization by developing “policies and practices that impose
reasonable limits on the collection and retention of consumer data.”240
Data minimization means limiting the collection and retention of data
to only what is necessary to accomplish a particular task, rather than
operating under a default that more data is always better.241 Data
minimization has been an important privacy principle for over thirty
years and has been promoted by entities like the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the Obama
White House.242 The FTC says that minimization helps protects
against two distinct privacy harms: (1) it creates smaller data sets,
which present a less attractive target for hackers and expose less
information in the event of a breach; and (2) it reduces the risk that
data will be used in a way that violates the data subject’s reasonable
expectations.243 The FTC makes more detailed recommendations on
how to implement minimization in IoT, which this Article examines
below.

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id.at 34.
See Bernard Marr, Why Data Minimization Is An Important Concept In The Age
(Mar.
16,
2016,
3:24
AM),
of
Big
Data,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/03/16/why-data-minimization-is-an-importantconcept-in-the-age-of-big-data/#11dc6dc11da4 [http://perma.cc/86YH-5FW9].
242. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 34.
243. Id.at 34–35
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a. “Impose reasonable limits on the collection and retention of
consumer data”244
The FTC states that “the data minimization principle remains
relevant and important to the IoT.”245 Its report notes that “if a
company collects and retains large amounts of data, there is an
increased risk that the data will be used in a way that departs from
consumers’ reasonable expectations,” which would harm user
privacy.246 It cites a hypothetical example of a wearable patch to
assess a user’s skin condition; the device manufacturer does not need
to collect precise geolocation data to perform its main function, but it
may want to do so in the future to enable a new feature.247 The report
suggests the manufacturer wait to collect location data until it decides
to launch the new feature and consider using less information (zip
code instead of precise location).248
This recommendation applies to BWCs. As discussed below, in
many cases BWC policies already impose limits on recording, such as
prohibitions on recording in bathrooms or locker rooms to protect
officer privacy.249 Setting shorter retention periods on camera footage
also achieves data minimization, where the specific footage is no
longer needed for the original law enforcement purposes.250 Other
minimization opportunities may exist in particular police systems as
well.
b.

“[T]ake reasonable steps to de-identify the data”251

The FTC suggests that when companies decide to retain data,
“they should also consider whether they can do so while maintaining
data in de-identified form.”252 “De-identified” data is data which has
been stripped of personally identifiable information or data fields that

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36–37.
Id at 36.
See supra text accompanying notes 42–43; see also CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG
POLICE DEP’T, CMPD DIRECTIVES § 400-006 (2015), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static
/policies/2016-06-08%20Charlotte-Mecklenburg%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [http://perma.cc
/5XDZ-BWZR].
250. See, e.g., CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEP’T, supra note 249, at § 400006.
251. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 38.
252. Id. at 37.
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link to an individual.253 The FTC gives the example of a smartphone
health-tracking application that collects consumer information like
geolocation.254 Such an application could “maintain and post
information in anonymous and aggregate form, which can benefit
public health authorities and the public, while at the same time
maintaining consumer privacy.”255 The FTC warns, however, that
companies must take care that data is not re-identified and may wish
to take various measures to reduce that risk, such as by employing a
de-identification expert similar to procedures under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).256 Deidentification also means “keeping up with technological
developments” that may threaten the privacy de-identified data down
the line.257
This recommendation may apply to BWCs in some contexts.
Video footage held for evidentiary purposes will naturally require
identifying information to be useful. However, video that
departments release to the public for other purposes, such as in
response to Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests, may
warrant de-identification.258 In some cases, departments blur the faces
of bystanders in videos, which is a form of de-identification.259 In
those instances, de-identification or redaction may serve the dual
purpose of transparency and privacy better than either displaying the
un-blurred faces or simply withholding footage.

253. Cf. Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health
Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA)
Privacy
Rule,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3FMW-Z856] (providing methods of de-identification to meet the
requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
254. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 37.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 38.
258. Michael Lickstein, Police Body Cameras and Public Records Requests: Another
Privacy Frontier, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (Mar. 30, 2016), http://stlr.org/2016/03/30
/police-body-cameras-and-public-records-requests-another-privacy-frontier/ [http://perma.cc
/R77U-6UTX].
259. See Alex Pasternack, Police Body Cameras Will Do More Than Just Record You,
FAST COMPANY (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3061935/police-bodycameras-livestreaming-face-recognition-and-ai [http://perma.cc/KD4X-VZ5Z].
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Make a public commitment “not to re-identify” data260

The FTC calls on companies to “publicly commit not to reidentify . . . data.”261 A public promise by a private company allows
the FTC to enforce that promise, because if the company does
otherwise it is an unlawful “deceptive act,” in commerce.262 Police
departments are outside of the scope of FTC enforcement, which
applies to commercial actors.263 By contrast, the FTC may be able to
enforce such promises by third-party commercial vendors of BWCs
and the associated cloud services. In addition, public promises not to
re-identify BWC footage may help build public trust in this
technology. This recommendation may therefore still be applicable in
the BWC context.
d. Have enforceable contracts with third parties not to reidentify264
The FTC recommends companies “have enforceable contracts in
place with any third parties with whom they share the data, requiring
the third parties to commit not to re-identify the data.”265 Because
digital data is easily copied or transferred, privacy protections must
extend to third parties that handle that data in order to be
meaningful. If a company de-identifies their data sets but then hands
the data to a company that immediately re-identifies individuals, that
protection was ineffective. This recommendation applies to BWCs to
the extent police departments de-identify their footage. Many police
departments rely on third parties such as Axon (formerly Taser) to
process and store their BWC footage. Thus, police departments can

260. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 38.
261. Id.
262. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
deemed unlawful.”); see Stephanie L. Kroeze, The FTC Won’t Let Me Be: The Need for a
Private Right of Action Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 227, 234–36
(2015) (“Any person who violates one the FTC’s trade regulation rules with actual
knowledge, or knowledge that can be implied based on objective circumstances, is liable
for civil penalties . . . provided the act is unfair or deceptive . . . . [A] deceptive act occurs
where a representation, omission, or practice misleads the consumer, the consumer
interprets the characteristic in a reasonable manner, and the misleading characteristic is
material.”).
263. Federal law empowers the FTC to regulate “persons, partnerships, or
corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
264. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 38.
265. Id.
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require such vendors not to re-identify through contract, backed by
FTC, state attorney general, or other enforcement against the vendor
for violation.266
3. Notice and Choice
While noting the difficulties of providing notice and choice in
IoT, the FTC report says “that providing notice and choice remains
important, as potential privacy and security risks may be heightened
due to the pervasiveness of data collection inherent in the IoT.”267
The FTC incorporates a “use-based” model into its approach to
providing notice and choice to consumers.268 This means that notice is
not required when a company collects and uses consumer data in a
way that is “consistent with the context of a transaction or the
company’s relationship with the consumer.”269 On the other hand,
data uses that are inconsistent with the consumer’s reasonable
expectations should require notice and choice.270
The FTC uses the example of a smart oven to illustrate its
point.271 The oven might be paired with a smartphone app that allows
the user to remotely control temperature and baking time. In that
case, using the consumer’s oven-usage data to improve the device’s
performance would not require consumer choice because consumers
would reasonably expect such usage.272 However, sharing that data
with a data broker or advertiser “would be inconsistent with the
context of the consumer’s relationship with the manufacturer,” so the
company should provide notice and choice.273
This “use-based” approach may or may not be applicable to
BWCs. It is likely that if video footage is recorded in one context (say

266. The FTC may bring enforcement actions against companies that break publicly
made promises as “deceptive practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). State attorneys general,
depending on state law, generally have enforcement power under state unfair and
deceptive acts and practices statutes. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 6 (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf
/udap/report_50_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/S59A-B2KS]. Police departments that enter
into contracts with vendors such as Axon may also bring a civil suit for breach of contract
by the vendor.
267. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 39.
268. Id. at 43.
269. Id. at 40.
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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a routine traffic stop), and later becomes relevant to another context
(say a murder investigation), the police should not need to seek the
video subject’s (i.e., the suspect’s) consent to use the video. The
interest in solving and prosecuting a crime are too great in such a
case. If the context shifts to something other than evidentiary use in a
criminal prosecution, however, it may make more sense to seek
renewed consent. Police departments may wish to provide notice or
seek consent before releasing videos to the public, for instance,
although doing so surfaces the tension between privacy and
transparency.
The FTC recommends other specific methods of providing notice
and choice in IoT devices. Many of these recommendations likely do
not apply to BWCs, because the FTC assumes that the device’s user
will have some access to an interface to modify privacy settings, even
if that interface is not on the device itself.274 BWCs operate in a
different context however. While the privacy of the BWC user (the
police officer) is important, the subjects of the video footage (the
public) will not have access to such an interface. Therefore, some of
the recommendations like QR codes on devices, consumer choice
during set up, management portals or dashboards, or general privacy
menus do not apply and have been omitted from the discussion.275
Nevertheless, some of the other best practices may still apply or be
informative for addressing privacy and cybersecurity concerns, so
they are included below.
a.

Choices at point of sale

The FTC advocates, with regard to individual consumers, “opt-in
choices at the time of purchase in ‘[p]lain language and multiple
choices of levels.’”276 The concept of a “point of sale,” when police
departments purchase cameras from their vendors, is not necessarily
relevant to BWCs. But if the “point of sale” is the point at which
officers interact with citizens, then this recommendation could make
sense. Some police department policies instruct officers to obtain
consent to record when they interact with the public.277

274. See id. at 40–41.
275. Id. at 41–42.
276. Id. at 41.
277. Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard, UPTURN (Nov. 2017),
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/ [https://perma.cc/UX8J-BWTD].
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Tutorials

The FTC suggests that IoT manufacturers offer tutorial videos to
consumers on how to control privacy settings on their devices.278 This
recommendation could be useful to inform police officers about their
privacy vis-à-vis BWCs. Police departments may also provide tutorials
to the public about privacy and cybersecurity aspects of BWC and
camera footage.
c.

Icons

The FTC says that “[d]evices can use icons to quickly convey
important settings and attributes, such as when a device is connected
to the Internet.”279 This suggestion can apply to BWCs and is
currently being employed in cameras with a visible light to indicate
recording.280 Some cameras even deploy a front-facing screen that
shows members of the public how they are being recorded.281
d.

“Out of band” communications

The FTC suggests “[w]hen display or user attention is limited, it
is possible to communicate important privacy and security settings to
the user via other channels,” such as text or email.282 Similar
techniques may apply to BWCs, although they would need to adapt to
the unique circumstances of policing. For instance, it could be
plausible to imagine a smart phone app or other portable device that
automatically tagged an individual when they appear in BWC footage
and notify that person so they can review the footage after the fact.
Assuming such a system does not compromise the integrity of footage
or safety of officers, technology could be a means to give individuals
notice and choice.283

278. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 41.
279. Id. at 42.
280. See, e.g., Public Awareness Light on Police Body Cameras, WOLFCOM
ENTERPRISES,
http://www.policebodycameras.com/police-bodyworn-camera-articles
/police_public_awarness_indicator.htm [https://perma.cc/SXG7-NPX9].
281. D-Series, REVEAL MEDIA, https://www.revealmedia.com/products/d-series
[https://perma.cc/TY4G-RWWU]. The manufacturer promotes this feature by saying it
“has a proven calming effect on people being recorded and maximises transparency with
the public.” Id.
282. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 42.
283. This approach would raise its own privacy issues, however, due to the automated
identification of persons included in the video.
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A user experience approach

The FTC suggests that “companies could consider an approach
that applies learning from consumer behavior on IoT devices, in order
to personalize choices.”284 Many members of the public will not
interact with police officers often enough to form a personalized
choice, so this suggestion would not seem directly relevant. On the
other hand, further research may be useful concerning citizen
preferences on privacy with relation to BWCs, such as whether they
wish bystanders’ faces to be blurred or whether and when officers
should turn off the camera.
4. Administrative Privacy Controls
Another major report by the FTC, Protecting Consumer Privacy
in an Era of Rapid Change, lays out the FTC’s recommendations for
Privacy by Design and administrative privacy controls.285 Although
the report does not focus on IoT specifically, Privacy by Design is an
important concept for IoT because it seeks to build privacy into both
the device itself and the organizational processes that handle camera
footage and other personal data. This Article therefore includes a
brief discussion of the FTC’s Privacy by Design recommendations
below to complement its IoT-specific work.
a. “Data Security: Companies Must Provide Reasonable
Security for Consumer Data”286
The FTC report states “[i]t is well settled that companies must
provide reasonable security” as an aspect of Privacy by Design.287 The
Microsoft and BITAG reports discussed above explain security best
practices for IoT and their application to police BWCs.

284. Id.
285. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS 22–23
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3U5-WDWR].
286. Id. at 24.
287. Id.
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b. “Reasonable Collection Limitation: Companies Should Limit
Their Collection of Data”288
The FTC recommends that companies “limit data collection to
that which is consistent with the context of a particular transaction or
the consumer’s relationship with the business, or as required or
specifically authorized by law.”289 This recommendation articulates a
“data minimization” similar to the one discussed above.
This recommendation applies to police BWCs. Recall PERF’s
warning that always-on recording may interfere with community
policing interactions or witness interviews.290 Policies dictating that
officers turn off their cameras in certain situations are a form of data
minimization.
c. “Sound Data Retention: Companies Should Implement
Reasonable Data Retention and Disposal Policies”291
The FTC recommends that companies “implement reasonable
restrictions on the retention of data and should dispose of it once the
data has outlived the legitimate purpose for which it was collected.”292
The FTC notes, however, that retention periods may be flexible and
allowed to adapt to the needs of the organization and type of data.293
This recommendation clearly applies to BWCs as well. The
ACLU recommends that retention of BWC footage “be measured in
weeks not years, and video should be deleted after that period unless
a recording has been flagged.”294 Retaining footage for shorter
periods of time is seen as a data minimization technique that reduces
privacy risk.295 That BWCs are a type of IoT device lends further
support for adopting reasonable data retention policies from the IoT
literature.

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 41, at 12.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 285, at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
STANLEY, supra note 7, at 4.
See id. at 3–5.
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d. “Accuracy: Companies should maintain reasonable accuracy
of consumers’ data”296
The FTC recommends “reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy
of the data they collect and maintain, particularly if such data could
cause significant harm or be used to deny consumers services.”297 The
Commission also emphasizes here that measures to ensure accuracy
should be flexible and “scaled to the intended use and sensitivity of
the information.”298
BWC footage is potentially very sensitive and therefore may
warrant strict measures to ensure accuracy. This is especially true if
the footage has the potential to be released to the public or used in a
criminal prosecution. Maintaining the accuracy and integrity of this
data may require tagging and auditing as well as strict cybersecurity
measures like those discussed above.
e. “Companies should maintain comprehensive data
management procedures throughout the life cycle of their products
and services”299
For data management, the Commission recommends the
following measures:
(a) “designation of personnel responsible for the privacy
program;”
(b) “a risk assessment that, at a minimum, addresses
employee training and management and product design
and development;”
(c) “implementation of controls designed to address the
risks identified;”
(d) “appropriate oversight of service providers;” and
(e) “evaluation and adjustment of the privacy program in
light of regular testing and monitoring.”300
Each of these measures apples to police BWCs. It is likely that
police departments already have administrative procedures to
safeguard gathered information on the public, for example training on
how to handle evidence. Given the large volume of sensitive data the
BWCs may generate, police departments may need to expand these
procedures and formulate new ones. They should consider programs
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 285, at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
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that focus specifically on privacy, incorporating the measures listed
above. Oversight of service providers is particularly important if
departments use outside parties to handle the BWC footage.
D. Operationalizing Best Practices from the Expert IoT Literature
We hope the discussion here can speed up the transfer of insight
from IoT privacy and security experts to police departments
implementing BWC programs. Each police department is different,
and policies must respond to local conditions. Further, we have not
done field research on the institutional practices of the police.
Nevertheless, we offer three points about how departments can
operationalize these recommendations, then discuss the relevance of
“smart city” developments, and conclude with comments on the
importance of having technical, physical, and administrative
safeguards for privacy and cybersecurity.
We first stress the importance of the contractual terms when
police departments procure BWCs and related services. As is true in
the private sector,301 these contracts often provide the clearest legal
source for requiring effective cybersecurity and privacy protection.
Professor Jan Whittington and co-authors have written that local
governments have the ability to be “market makers,” not market
takers” who must unquestionably accept contractual terms from their
vendors.302 Notably, state and local governments can provide by law
that BWC procurements be done consistently with strong
cybersecurity and privacy requirements. Bargaining power will vary
based on the size of the department and other factors such as local
procurement regulations, but police departments quite likely are
better positioned to demand privacy and security best practices than
the average consumer in the commercial IoT space.
Second, police departments can draw on their experience
handling analog evidence to inform how they treat digital evidence.
While digital evidence presents some unique challenges, some of
which we explore above, departments should have experience

301. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FFIEC CYBERSECURITY
ASSESSMENT TOOL 49 (2017), https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/cybersecurity/FFIEC_CAT_May
_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC7Q-X4GX].
302. Jan Whittington et al., Push, Pull, and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study in
Municipal Open Government, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1899, 1954 (2015). But see
Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 112–17 (2017) (documenting the power of surveillance technology
companies, including BWC manufacturers, to influence policy) .
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securing physical evidence to preserve the chain of custody and
procedures to protect the privacy of victims. Departments will need to
adapt to the digital age, but their old practices and principles will still
be useful.
Third, police departments lack the institutional resources or
experience to implement these best practices and should therefore
consider seeking outside assistance. Such assistance could come from
a variety of sources, such as the U.S. DOJ, industry associations such
as PERF, or outside consultants. The U.S. DOJ and PERF have
already studied BWC issues in depth and have preexisting channels
through which to spread that research.303 A key point of this Article is
that there are challenging issues of privacy and cybersecurity that
apply to BWCs, which merit systematic attention and adoption of best
practices. These issues are also a fruitful area of ongoing research.304
One useful way to see the connection of BWCs to the IoT
literature is to think of BWCs as a “smart city” application. Smart
cities are cities “that integrate information and communication
technologies (“ICTs”) and the Internet of Things (IoT) to manage the
city’s assets and delivery of services.”305 Because smart cities rely
heavily on IoT devices,306 smart city research overlaps with IoT
research. Cities have done extensive work implementing privacy and
security best practices and policies that can inform the work of police
departments. The cities of Seattle and San Francisco have public
documents detailing their privacy and cybersecurity practices.307
Localities have been enacting local ordinances that govern
implementation of new surveillance technologies, including in Seattle,
Oakland, and Santa Clara County (California).308 Whether from
303. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 37; MILLER & TOLIVER,
supra note 41.
304. For one example of research on how police departments handle digital evidence,
see Sheona A. Hoolachan & William B. Glisson, Organizational Handling of Digital
Evidence, 2010 ADFSL CONF. ON DIGITAL FORENSICS, SECURITY, & L. 33, 41–43 (2010).
305. Woo, supra note 59, at 956.
306. Id. at 955.
307. See CITY OF SEATTLE, CITY OF SEATTLE PRIVACY PROGRAM 1, 23–33 (Oct.
2015), http://ctab.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/COS-Privacy-Program.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MFS-KUBY]; ERICA FINKLE, DATASF: RESOURCES, OPEN DATA
RELEASE TOOLKIT: PRIVACY EDITION 4–7 https://docs.google.com/document/d
/1MhvEuGKFuGY2vLcNqiXBsPjCzxYebe4dJicRWe6gf_s/edit [https://perma.cc/C8CSVC4Q].
308. Kevin Schofield, Council Passes Surveillance Technology Ordinance, SCC
INSIGHT (July 31, 2017) https://sccinsight.com/2017/07/31/council-passes-surveillancetechnology-ordinance/ [https://perma.cc/BT7M-HPHL]; Privacy Advisory Commission,
CITY OF OAKLAND, http://www2.oaklandnet.com/OAK057463 [https://perma.cc/D7J9-
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smart cities or the broader IoT literature, there is a wealth of
information to help police departments implement BWCs while
addressing privacy and cybersecurity concerns.
In mining previous cybersecurity and privacy sources for lessons
for BWCs, this Article concludes with discussion of the importance of
a system that addresses the full range of technical, physical, and
administrative controls. The discussion here has examined three
sources of recommendations, which significantly emphasized
technical controls (BITAG), physical safeguards (Microsoft,
emphasizing hardware risks), and administrative/organizational
controls (the FTC). This framework of technical, physical, and
administrative controls is longstanding and useful way to think about
privacy and cybersecurity. The three categories of controls are set
forth in a leading law and regulation—the Privacy Act of 1974309 and
the HIPAA Privacy Rule.310 Police departments and policy makers
should examine risks and controls for all three of these realms as they
proceed with their BWC programs.
III. LESSONS FOR IOT FROM BWCS
Part II discussed lessons from IoT for BWCs. This Part considers
two lessons that BWCs may offer for privacy and cybersecurity in the
IoT. The first lesson is recognizing that IoT devices are not “always
on.” Instead, there are important issues to consider about when the
IoT devices should record or not, depending on time and context. The
second lesson is the potentially crucial role of transparency and
accountability for determining when to provide information from an
IoT device to various audiences. In these two respects, BWCs
highlight issues that apply more generally to IoT, but where the BWC
context makes the two issues more salient than in other IoT settings
studied to date.
The implicit assumption in many smart cities and other IoT
deployments is that the sensors are “always on.” For instance, it
3MWV]; Cutting-edge Surveillance Ordinance Approved for Santa Clara County, CTY.
SANTA CLARA (June 7, 2016), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/d5/newsmedia/pressreleases/Pages/SurveillanceOrdinance.aspx [https://perma.cc/NPE6-6MHX].
309. 5 U.S.C. § 522(e)(10) (2012) (requiring “each agency” to “establish appropriate
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality
of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to their security or
integrity which could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or
unfairness to any individual on whom information is maintained”).
310. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308–.312 (2017) (describing administrative, physical, and
technical safeguard standards for the privacy of electronic protected health information).
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makes sense for weather sensors to report atmospheric conditions on
a 24/7 basis, for smart utility meters to measure usage continuously,
and for sensors that detect urban gunshots to pick up sounds any time
of the day or night. In the BITAG and Microsoft list of
recommendations discussed in Part II, the issue of “always on” or
“when to have the sensor on” does not appear explicitly in any of the
recommendations. The FTC makes general recommendations about
data minimization but does not focus on the data minimization
technique of regularly turning the device off entirely.
By contrast, a significant issue for BWC governance is when the
camera should be running. Work by Professor Fan and the digital
rights group Upturn notes that in many cases the policies governing
BWC use prohibit recording in bathrooms or locker rooms.311
Scholars and advocacy groups suggest that officers should turn
cameras off either at the request of victims or witnesses,312 or in some
cases should default to an opt-in regime.313 The ACLU originally
advocated something close to an “always on” model but eventually
modified its position to recognize clear limits on recording to respect
privacy.314 This is in recognition that even in a context where
ubiquitous recording is the norm, certain types of data are so sensitive
that “always on” collection is inappropriate. Certain locations where
people have a heightened expectation of privacy, or certain people
who may be extra sensitive from trauma or other reasons, warrant
clear limits on recording.
The need for transparency has also been a much more prominent
issue for BWCs than for IoT generally. Transparency has been a
principle reason cited by BWC advocates to adopt the technology.315
For those supporting transparency, the rationale is that transparency
will deter bad behavior and engender trust between officers and the
communities they serve.316 The value of transparency to detect bad
behavior and foster future deterrence is illustrated by a high-profile
2017 incident of police officers caught planting drugs at a crime
311. Fan, supra note 10, at 429; UPTURN, supra note 277.
312. See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 41, at 12–13; STANLEY, supra note 7, at 3;
UPTURN, supra note 277.
313. Fan, supra note 10, at 429.
314. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 3.
315. See, e.g., id. at 2; UPTURN, supra note 277, at 4.
316. The ACLU lists policy goals for BWCs as “providing oversight, reducing police
abuses, and increasing community trust.” Police Body Cameras, AM. C.L. UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/police-body-cameras
[https://perma.cc/HSE3-3AHH].
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scene.317 Support for transparency has led commentators to worry that
efforts to block release of BWC footage under state FOIAs will
undermine transparency.318 Advocates have opposed FOIA
exemptions for BWC footage, showing the high value placed on
transparency and accountability in the BWC context.319
Transparency has not been nearly as prominent a feature in the
IoT literature more generally. There has indeed been attention to
transparency in a somewhat different sense, such as where the FTC
calls for greater transparency in company data practices through
better privacy notices, consumer access to their data, and better
consumer education.320 The Online Trust Alliance, an industry group
promoting best practices in IoT, similarly calls for transparency in the
form of increased disclosure of data practices.321 This meaning of
“transparency,” however, applies to transparency about an
organization’s policies and practices. In contrast, the core meaning of
transparency in the BWC context has been about what is sometimes
called “open data”—when and whether to release the actual video
and accompanying audio to the general public.
This sort of “open data” issue has come up in the context of
smart cities and other collection of information by the government.
The Obama administration, for instance, had open data initiatives
such as release of data on data.gov.322 Authors including David Brin
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have also advocated for greater release of video feeds and other data
in the name of transparency and accountability.323 In practice,
however, privacy concerns and the risk of re-identification have often
resulted in data being released publicly than supporters had initially
hoped. One important feature of BWCs is that full video is being
released in many instances, despite concerns from the privacy side
that bystanders, victims, or others are suffering a privacy violation
due to such release.
These lessons from BWCs can inform best practices for IoT more
generally. Best practice guides, such as those created by BITAG and
Microsoft, quite possibly should consider more explicitly when to
have an “always on” model, and when instead to minimize or stop
data collection based on time of day or other criteria. Restrictions on
BWC recording in bathrooms suggests that the location of recording
may be an important guidepost. Limits on recording bystanders or
witnesses implies that certain categories of people require greater
sensitivity. U.S. law already recognizes heightened privacy interests of
children and of data in the healthcare and financial fields.324 We
suggest that the IoT literature could explore application of limits
based on place, person, or time. The IoT literature could also take
note of the emphasis on transparency and open data in the BWC
literature. BWCs are seen as a tool to hold powerful actors (police
officers) to account. The value of transparency for data feeds from
BWCs may provide broader lessons for how transparency could
become a greater priority in other IoT settings.
CONCLUSION
A first conclusion of this Article is that BWCs are indeed an
instance of IoT. The cameras and microphones are sensors, and the
video and audio feeds characteristically go to storage in the cloud,

2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/02/05/big-data-and-privacy-1-yearout [https://perma.cc/V26P-BZ72].
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TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 8–15, 326–29 (1998). Brin argues that
“accountability is no side benefit . . . . Without the accountability that derives from
openness—enforceable upon even the mightiest individuals and institutions—how can
freedom survive?” Id. at 13. Further, Brin argues, “[a]ccountability is the only defense that
ever adequately protected free speech.” Id. at 327.
324. Federal law specifically regulates privacy in each of these areas. Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012); Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801.
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thus matching the standard IoT definition of sensors with cloud
storage.
Understanding this technological equivalence of BWCs and IoT
assists those seeking to manage the privacy and cybersecurity risks of
BWCs. Police departments may understandably find that managing
those risks is an expensive and daunting task. A principle goal of this
Article has been to provide rich sources of best practices to assist
those deploying and administering BWCs and the accompanying data
services. One related outcome is to highlight the role of the
procurement contract in governing privacy and cybersecurity risks.
Under state or local law, or negotiation of individual contracts, cities
and police departments have an opportunity to set requirements for
how privacy and cybersecurity will be managed by the third-party
vendors who are so important to the deployment of BWCs and
related services.
Another outcome of the Article is to provide insights from the
BWC experience for IoT more generally. An implicit assumption for
many IoT deployments is that the sensors are “always on.” For
BWCs, this is typically not the case, and IoT best practices can do
more to highlight the opportunity to toggle off sensors, achieving data
minimization goals. In addition, BWCs are an example of “open
data” where the full data feed is often available to the public. Those
who have been debating the benefits of open data efforts, and the
privacy and other associated risks, can learn from the extensive
discussions about when transparency and open release of the video is
appropriate for BWC footage.
Privacy and cybersecurity risks will continue to evolve for both
IoT generally and BWCs more specifically. Recognizing the overlap
of these two usually distinct discourses can offer assistance to those in
both realms as they face the new risks.
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